Corporate Governance Reforms in Continental Europe
According to the recent research conducted by Luca Enriques and Paolo Volpin "corporate governance in continental Europe traditionally differs from that in the United States in two important ways: first, most European companies have controlling shareholders, while most American corporations are widely held; second, the regulations on self-dealing have traditionally been stricter in the United States.
In the last 15 years, France, Germany, and Italy have enacted significant corporate law reforms to strengthen the mechanisms of internal governance, empower shareholders, enhance disclosure requirements, and toughen public enforcement. Special emphasis was placed on empowering minority shareholders and on disclosure, which are the most effective tools for countering abuses by dominant shareholders."
The writers put particular emphasis on the reforms made to resolve the problem of related-party transactions and preventing self-dealing by controlling shareholders.
In Turkey, concept of minority shareholder is defined very recently with Capital Markets Board's Corporate Governance Principles. But in the past non-controlling shareholders experienced unjust treatment.
In the last 15 years, France, Germany, and Italy have enacted significant corporate law reforms to strengthen the mechanisms of internal governance, empower shareholders, enhance disclosure requirements, and toughen public enforcement. Special emphasis was placed on empowering minority shareholders and on disclosure, which are the most effective tools for countering abuses by dominant shareholders."
The writers put particular emphasis on the reforms made to resolve the problem of related-party transactions and preventing self-dealing by controlling shareholders.
In Turkey, concept of minority shareholder is defined very recently with Capital Markets Board's Corporate Governance Principles. But in the past non-controlling shareholders experienced unjust treatment.
